The Tax Consequences of the Maryland Marital Property Act by Levi, Jeffrey H.
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 9
Issue 1 Fall 1979 Article 3
1979
The Tax Consequences of the Maryland Marital
Property Act
Jeffrey H. Levi
University of Baltimore School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Levi, Jeffrey H. (1979) "The Tax Consequences of the Maryland Marital Property Act," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 9: Iss.
1, Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol9/iss1/3
THE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF THE MARYLAND
MARITAL PROPERTY ACT
Jeffrey H. Levit
Since the adoption of the Marital Property Act by the
General Assembly, the Act has been the subject of much
commentary. This Article examines the federal income
taxation consequences of the new divorce property settle-
ment scheme. The author concludes that inasmuch as the
Act stops short of the community property concept, it will
have significant tax consequences for both spouses.
I. BACKGROUND
During its 1978 session the General Assembly of Maryland
passed the Marital Property Act1 and significantly altered the
Maryland law concerning disposition of property upon divorce or
annulment. Maryland thereupon shifted from a separate property
jurisdiction to a quasi-separate property jurisdiction. The purpose
of this article is to analyze the tax effects of the new law. This
analysis contains three parts: a brief examination of the prior
disposition of property law and its tax consequences; an examina-
tion of the Marital Property Act and the resulting tax consequences
of a court order, award, or decree; and the tax consequences of a
property settlement agreement. 2
Prior to the discussion of the tax consequences of the Act, a
thorough examination of state law defining property rights is
required. Although state law defines the nature of the legal right to
property, federal law specifies how rights created under state law
will be taxed. 3 An example of the deference which the United States
t A.B., 1971, Colgate University; J.D., 1976, University of Baltimore; Admitted to
practice in the District of Columbia, Member of the Maryland Bar.
1. Act of May 29, 1978, ch. 794, 1978 Md. Laws 2304 (codified as amended at MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-6A-01 to 3-6A-07 (Supp. 1979)) [hereinafter
referred to as the Maryland Property Act]. See generally Comment, Property
Disposition upon Divorce in Maryland: An Analysis of the New Statute, 8 U.
BALT. L. REV. 377 (1979).
2. The author is aware that Maryland law provides that "[e]quality of Rights under
the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex." MD. CONST., DECL. OF
RIGHTS art. 46. Thus, article 46 ensures that either spouse may be granted a
monetary award as an adjustment of rights under the Marital Property Act.
Merely for stylistic purposes, however, the author has designated the husband as
the economically dominant spouse throughout the article.
3. Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232 (1944); Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78
(1940); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
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Supreme Court has shown to a highest state court's definition of
property may be seen in Collins v. Commissioner,' in which a Tenth
Circuit decision was remanded in light of the adjudication of
property rights by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in a case incident
to divorce.5
II. PRIOR MARYLAND PROPERTY LAW AND
ITS TAX CONSEQUENCES
Prior to the enactment of the Marital Property Act, Maryland
was a separate property jurisdiction. Maryland courts in divorce
proceedings had no power to transfer the husband's separate
property to the wife. 6 If a husband purchased property with his
funds and titled it in his name alone, the courts were without any
power to compel transfer of title to the wife. The General Assembly
did provide for court determination and apportionment of property
rights in connection with the ownership of personal property which
was titled only in the name of one party, but the courts were limited
to considering solely the actual monetary contribution of the parties
to that property. 7 In tracing the actual contribution to the
acquisition of property, a court could order a partition or sale upon a
finding that a partnership existed8 or that a constructive trust had
been created,9 but the court was powerless to transfer property titled
in the husband's name to the wife when the wife neither brought
property to the marriage nor worked during the marriage. 10
4. 393 U.S. 215 (1968). The Collins family of cases is discussed at length later in the
article. See notes 43-73 and accompanying text infra.
5. Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968).
6. Lopez v. Lopez, 206 Md. 509, 518, 112 A.2d 466, 470 (1955); Dougherty v.
Dougherty, 187 Md. 21, 32, 48 A.2d 451, 457 (1946).
7. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 29 (1973) (repealed). See Joyce v. Joyce, 16 Md. App. 17,
293 A.2d 839 (1972). Subsequent similar provisions were codified at MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-603 (Supp. 1978) (repealed). The current provisions for
the disposition of personal property are found at MD. CTS. & JUD. PRoc. CODE
ANN. § 3-6A-03 (Supp. 1979).
8. Gosman v. Gosman, 271 Md. 514, 318 A.2d 821 (1974).
9. Ensor v. Ensor, 270 Md. 549, 312 A.2d 286 (1973).
10. Gebhard v. Gebhard, 253 Md. 125, 129, 252 A.2d 171, 173 (1969). It would be
remiss not to mention Bender v. Bender, 282 Md. 525, 534, 386 A.2d 772, 778-79(1978), in which the court of appeals carved out an exception to the rule, cited in
Gebhard, Lopez, and Dougherty, that the courts did not have the power to
transfer property from the husband to the wife. The court of appeals declared
that there is a rebuttable presumption that household goods and furnishings
purchased by one spouse before or during marriage are owned by both the
husband and wife jointly by the entirety. It is presumed that the husband made a
gift to the marriage of the household goods and furnishings.
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The tax implications of a divorce, consequently, were relatively
straightforward. Because the court had no power to transfer property
from the husband to the wife, no taxable event occurred. If the
husband transferred property to the wife in satisfaction of alimony,
the transfer was considered to be a sale of the property from the
husband to the wife on which the husband had to pay income tax on
a capital gain, if appropriate." The capital gain was equal to the fair
market value of the property on the date of transfer less the adjusted
basis of the property. More importantly, however, the wife did not
realize any capital gain on the transfer of property to her. Her basis
was equal to the fair market value of the property on the date of the
transfer.12 If the husband transferred property to her that was held
in tenancy by the entireties,13 he recognized a capital gain equal to
one-half of the fair market value on the date of transfer less one-half
of the adjusted basis on the date of transfer.14 The wife's basis in the
property after the transfer was equal to one-half of the original cost
basis in the property plus one-half of the fair market value on the
date of transfer.15
In summary, under prior law, the husband's transfer of property
to the wife was considered to be a sale with the resulting recognition
of gain in the same manner as if the sale were made at arm's length
to a third party. The wife's basis was equal to the fair market value
of the property at the date of the transfer because she "purchased"
the property from the husband by surrendering her inchoate marital
rights. The wife recognized no gain in the surrender of these marital
rights because their basis was held to be equal to the fair market
value of the property which she received.
III. THE MARITAL PROPERTY ACT - THE PROBLEM
The Marital Property Act substantially altered the rights of the
husband and wife in a divorce proceeding. As mentioned previously,
the divorce proceeding formerly could not affect the rights in solely
owned property. The law now entitles the wife to a monetary award,
which reflects her contribution to the acquisition of property during
the marriage.16 The property subject to this monetary award
includes any property acquired during the marriage without regard
to title, but excludes property acquired by either inheritance or gift
from a third party, any property excluded by a valid property
settlement agreement, or any other property traceable to any of the
11. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
12. Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63.
13. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 4-108(b)(3) (1974). Contrary to the common law,
Maryland provides for the conveyance by one member of a tenancy by the
entirety to the other.
14. Stephens v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 345 (1962).
15. McKinney v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 263 (1975).
16. MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN § 3-6A-05(a) (Supp. 1979).
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excluded sources. 17 This award to the wife or non-titled contributing
spouse is not mandatory, but is discretionary based upon the
following factors: the monetary and non-monetary contributions of
the parties during the marriage; the property owned by the parties
without regard to title; the financial situation of the parties at the
time of the award; the circumstances leading to the dissolution of the
marriage; the length of the marriage; the age, physical and mental
condition of the parties; the effort expended by each party in
accumulating the marital property, including how and when the
property was acquired; disposition of personal property or the family
home; and such other factors that the court may deem necessary to
17. Id. §3-6A-01(e).
The definition of marital property in and of itself presents many interesting
problems. The statute as written fails to take into account the appreciation of
property during the marriage which is the sole result of the husband's efforts and
labor. An example is an instance when the husband owns an unincorporated
business prior to the marriage. If the husband fails to incorporate the business, it
is easy to identify any additional property which he acquires after the date of the
marriage. All that has to be done is check his books and tax returns. However, if
this same man incorporates his business before the marriage and receives shares
of stock in the new corporation, he now merely owns shares of stock which, by
definition, is property acquired prior to the marriage and thereby excluded from
the purview of the statute. Because a stockholder owns only shares in the
corporation and not the assets that are titled in the corporation's name, the
husband has effectively excluded any appreciation in the value of the business
as reflected in assets acquired by the corporation after the date of marriage. This
is especially important in a business which is owned by one person who makes
his living from this business and whose wealth is reflected in the prosperity of
the business. The use of the corporate mechanism shelters the owner from
accounting for much of the appreciation of his net worth for which he would
ordinarily account if he remained a sole proprietor. This appears to be an
effective means of sheltering the earnings of the husband, the profits, and
appreciation from property which otherwise might be characterized as marital
property due to the fact that it resulted from the skill and efforts of the husband
during marriage.
This problem has not gone unrecognized by states that follow community
property law. In Johnson v. Johnson, 89 Nev. 244, 510 P.2d 625 (1973), the
Supreme Court of Nevada recognized that, although the stock in the husband's
business may be titled in the husband's name alone because the business was
incorporated prior to marriage, the increase in value in the stock resulting from
the labor, skill, and industry of the husband during the marriage should be
subject to division under community property law.
As previously discussed, the Marital Property Act specifically excludes
property acquired before the marriage. Therefore, the author recommends that a
sole proprietor incorporate his business prior to his marriage in order to avoid
the inclusion of this property in the "marital property." Although the author
fully appreciates that the stated purpose of this article is to analyze the tax
effects of the Marital Property Act, he firmly believes that one of the best
methods of tax planning is to exclude property solely owned by the husband
prior to the marriage from the purview of the Act so that the property remains
the husband's sole property and is thereby exempt from taxation due to the
absence of any transaction.
In the same vein, consider the effect of the Marital Property Act on real
property owned by the husband subject to a mortgage. Since Maryland is a "title
state," it may be argued that the husband never had title to the property but
merely owned the equity of redemption. On the other hand, it may be argued
with equal force that the mortgagor has title against all of the world except his
Baltimore Law Review
arrive at an appropriate award.' 8 Any unpaid amount of the award
may be reduced to judgment. 19 The crucial factor for tax analysis of
the Act is that a Maryland court never has the right to transfer
ownership of either personal property 2° or real property.21 Rather,
the court may partition jointly held property or order a sale in lieu of
partition. 22 In this respect the law is unchanged. The court may also
declare the ownership interest of either spouse in the property,23 but
once it declares that one spouse is the sole owner of property no
compulsory transfer may take place. This concept is extremely
important because the wife never acquires any rights of ownership
in the res itself. Her rights do not attain the status of co-ownership
in the property but merely reflect what she may be awarded as
compensation in terms of a monetary judgment. This monetary
judgment, as in the case of any judgment, is the classic example of a
burden on the property. Even when the entire legal fault for the
dissolution of the marriage rests with the husband, the best that
any court could do to offset the injury to the wife is to award a large
judgment in her favor. The husband nonetheless retains the
ownership of the property subject to the judgment awarded to the
wife. The wife's rights, which may be asserted upon the filing of a
divorce and which are inchoate in the same sense as was dower,
never attain the dignity of co-ownership. The status of the wife's
rights will be discussed following an analysis of the principal cases
from other jurisdictions.
The final and perhaps most significant element of the statute is
the disposition of the family home and family use personal property.
mortgagee and that he acquired the property prior to the marriage. The
possibility exists that mortgaged property may be excluded from the definition of
marital property. In order to assure fully that this property will be excluded from
marital property, the husband should pay off the mortgage prior to the marriage
and get an unsecured loan if possible. By paying off the mortgage, the husband
avoids the marital property problem because the mortgage will not be paid off
with marital property earnings. This prevents any argument by the wife that the
husband did not have title in the property and that he only acquired title in the
property by using marital property funds.
The author also recommends that the husband continue to retain in his sole
name after the marriage all stocks, bonds, and bank accounts which he had in
his own name prior to the marriage. This, too, will prevent these items from
being included in marital property. This segregation of assets can only serve to
help the husband trace his separate property at the dissolution of the marriage.
Finally, when the husband transfers funds attributable to his separate property,
he should use a checking account established for the sole purpose of handling
separate property funds. In this manner, he can avoid the commingling of these
funds with marital property.
18. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-05(b) (Supp. 1979).
19. Id. §3-6A-05(c).
20. Id. §3-6A-03(a).
21. Id. §3-6A-04(a).
22. Id. §§3-6A-03(b)(2), 3-6A-04(b)(2).
23. Id. §§3-6A-03(b)(1), 3-6A-04(b)(1).
[Vol. 9
Marital Property Tax Consequences
The family home is defined as the principal residence of the family
as a unit, but does not include property acquired before the marriage,
by gift or inheritance from a third party, or property excluded by a
valid agreement. 24 Family use personal property is essentially
tangible personal property acquired during the marriage and used
around the home, including motor vehicles, but not including
property acquired by gift or inheritance from a third party.25 The Act
empowers courts to award temporary use of the family home and
family use personal property to the spouse who has custody of a
minor child so that the child may continue to live in familiar
surroundings. 26 As long as the custodial parent does not remarry,
this spouse and the minor child may have temporary possession of
the family home and family use personal property for a period not
exceeding three years. At the end of three years, or a lesser period if
the court so declares, the family home and family use personal
property will be treated as marital property unless the family home
or family use personal property was acquired prior to the marriage,
or by gift or inheritance from a third party, or excluded by a valid
agreement, in which case it shall be awarded to its rightful owner.27
The court may also order the spouse who is not the occupant of the
family home to pay for any or all of its upkeep including rent or
mortgage payments, insurance, taxes, and maintenance. 28
In summary, the Marital Property Act allows a possible
monetary judgment in favor of the wife in order more accurately to
reflect her monetary and non-monetary contributions to the
accumulation of property during the marriage. The Act recognizes
24. Id. §3-6A-01(b).
25. Id. § 3-6A-01(c). Act of May 14, 1979, ch. 295, 1979 Md. Laws 957, effective July
1, 1979, amends this provision of the Marital Property Act to enlarge the
exclusion. With the adoption of this statute, family use personal property may
now be excluded by a valid agreement.
26. Id. § 3-6A-06(a).
27. Id. § 3-6A-06(f). There is a conflict which must be noted between the definitional
and operational sections of the Marital Property Act concerning family use
personal property and the family home. In the definitional section, § 3-6A-01,
property acquired before the marriage, by gift or inheritance from a third party,
or excluded by a valid agreement is excluded from family use personal property
and the family home. One would think in reading this definitional section that
property so acquired is excluded from a temporary use and possession order. Yet
the operational section of the statute states that upon the termination of a use
and possession order, property which was acquired before the marriage, by gift
or inheritance from a third party, or excluded by valid agreement shall be
returned to its actual owner. This implies that a person's sole property which was
acquired under these conditions is subject to a temporary use and possession
order. This conflicts directly with the definitional section which excludes the
very same property from the use and possession order. This inconsistency should
be resolved by the General Assembly. See Comment, Property Disposition upon
Divorce in Maryland: An Analysis of the New Statute, 8 U. BALT. L. REv. 377,
405 (1979) (citing additional inconsistencies).
28. Id. § 3-6A-06(c)(2).
1979]
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her contributions in and out of the home to the accumulation of
wealth by the family unit. While she has custody of the children, the
Act also permits her to continue to occupy the home for a period not
exceeding three years. In permitting this temporary occupancy, the
General Assembly has attempted to minimize the traumatic impact
of the divorce upon the children. In analyzing the tax consequences
of the Act, this article will first discuss the monetary award and then
the use and possession order.
IV. THE CASES
The key tax case in the analysis of any property transfer
resulting from a divorce is United States v. Davis.29 In Davis, the
husband transferred appreciated property under Delaware law
pursuant to a property settlement agreement. The agreement stated
that it constituted a "division in settlement of their property" 30 and
that it was "in full settlement and satisfaction of any and all claims
and rights against the husband whatsoever (including but not by
way of limitation, dower and all rights under the laws of testacy and
intestacy . . . ).,,31
The first issue addressed by the Davis Court was whether the
transfer of stock constituted a taxable event. The husband contended
that it was merely a non-taxable division of property pursuant to an
agreement between co-owners. The Court rejected this contention by
stating that under Delaware law the wife's rights in the husband's
property do not attain the dignity of co-ownership. 32 She had no
interest in her husband's property while he was alive and could
share in his estate only if she survived him. The wife's rights,
therefore, were inchoate rights. Her eventual share in her husband's
property was defined by the Delaware trial court's finding of
reasonableness, based on such factors as the wife's financial
condition, her accustomed standard of living, her age and health, the
age of the children, and the husband's earning capacity. 33 The
Supreme Court summarized that regardless of the labels affixed to
the transaction, Delaware law merely places a burden on the
husband's property analogous to alimony or support and does not
make the wife a co-owner. The husband's obligation under Davis is
personal in nature and is not a division of property between co-
owners.
In examining subsequent cases and analyzing the Marital
Property Act it is apparent that the principal issue, as in Davis, is
whether the wife's rights under the Act acquire the dignity of co-
29. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
30. Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 67.
32. Id. at 70.
33. Cf. MD. CTS & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §3-6A-05(b) (Supp. 1979) (listing the
factors on which a monetary award may be based).
[Vol. 9
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ownership, thereby constituting a division of property between co-
owners, or whether a personal obligation is placed upon the husband
by divorce which imposes a burden on his property. In post-Davis
cases, some jurisdictions have held that the rights of co-ownership
may be found, even though they arise only upon the filing of a
divorce. 34 Others hold that a number of factors may be considered in
arriving at the division of the property.35 The basic question,
however, remains whether a co-ownership or personal obligation
exists. The answer to this question is determinative of tax status
because if the wife is found to be the co-owner, there is merely a non-
tayable division of property between co-owners; otherwise, the event
is taxable.
In computing the gain to be taxed when the husband transferred
property to the wife, the Davis Court held that the husband realized
a gain in the amount of the difference between the fair market value
of the property on the date of transfer less his adjusted basis in the
property.36 Because the transfer was treated as an arm's length
transaction, the value of the property that was transferred by the
husband was presumed to be equal to the value of the marital rights
that the wife surrendered. The wife's basis in the property that she
received in exchange for those marital rights was the fair market
value of the property at the time of the transfer.37 In addition, there
was no gain in the surrender of the wife's marital rights because
they had no historical basis. 38
A significant Eighth Circuit decision applying Davis was
Wallace v. United States.39 The appellant's wife filed for divorce in
Iowa. The husband and wife entered into a property settlement
agreement whereby the wife retained her own real and personal
property and received the marital home. The wife received no
alimony, and the division of the husband's stock was left to the
court. The court ordered the husband to transfer to the wife stock
with a fair market value of $158,486 and a basis in the husband's
hands of $3,051.40 The issue before the court of appeals was whether
the gain of $155,435 was taxable to the husband. In holding that the
gain was taxable, the court noted that the Iowa statute on division of
34. Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975) (applying Colorado law).
35. Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968).
36. 370 U.S. at 72-74.
37. Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl.
1954) (where the court held that the cost basis of property received in a taxable
exchange is the fair market value of the property received in the exchange).
United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), made voluntary property settlement
transfers taxable events at least to the husband. See text accompanying note 29
supra.
38. 370 U.S. at 73 n.7; Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63.
39. 439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 831 (1971).
40. Id. at 758.
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property 41 gave the trial court, similar to the power given the
Delaware court in Davis, great discretion in awarding relief.
. The Wallace court also distinguished an apparently contrary
decision by the Tenth Circuit in Collins v. Commissioner.42 The
Tenth Circuit had held in Collins that an Oklahoma divorce resulted
in a non-taxable division of property because the wife "possessed a
species of common ownership in his [the husband's] property
'similar in conception to community property of community property
states.'"43 Collins was distinguished from Davis because the wife in
Collins was made part owner of the husband's property by operation
of a state statute. The courts in Oklahoma, therefore, had a
mandatory, and not a permissive duty to divide the jointly held
property. The court in Wallace concurred with the district court's
determination that Wallace was more similar to Davis than to
Collins because the wife's property rights were inchoate.
Wallace is important for two reasons. First, the Eighth Circuit
rejected the artificial distinction between a property settlement
agreement and a court order that adjusts the rights between the
parties. Wallace is also useful because the court sought to answer the
fundamental question for tax purposes of whether a property
transfer necessitated by a divorce made the wife a co-owner of the
property, or whether the statute merely granted inchoate rights to
the wife. The test set out in Wallace seemed to be that statutes
making the division of property mandatory are indicative of co-
ownership, while statutes establishing permissive division are
indicative of inchoate rights.
It follows, therefore, from Davis and Wallace that if the wife is
actually the co-owner of the property, then her right to the property
should be absolute so as to compel a mandatory division. It is the
proper function of the court to determine the extent of ownership
based upon those factors that the state legislature deems important.
This situation can be differentiated from the circumstance in which
the wife does not have any rights in the property until the court
makes a discretionary award of property to the wife. This
discretionary award is tentative and recognizes that the wife has no
current property rights, whereas the mandatory award recognizes
the wife as co-owner and seeks to adjudicate merely the extent of her
ownership.
41. IOWA CODE § 598.14 (1950): "When a divorce is decreed, the court may make such
order in relation to the children, property, parties, and the maintenance of the
parties as shall be right .... Subsequent changes may be made by it in these
respects when circumstances render them expedient."
42. 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
43. 439 F.2d at 760 (citing Collings v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290, 295
(Okla. 1968)). This Collins case [hereinafter Collins-Oklahoma] was the basis of
the remand order in Collins v. Commissioner, 393 U.S. 215 (1968).
[Vol. 9
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In Maryland, the granting of a monetary award under the
Marital Property Act rests with the discretion of the court. The wife
does not have an absolute right to this award but merely a tentative
or inchoate right based upon the court's discretion. The size of the
award is not important in determining her tax status. The fact that
her right is tentative is an indication, according to the Wallace test,
that the wife is not a co-owner of the property and that she has
merely inchoate rights in the property.
The most thorough exposition of the law on this subject is
Collins v. Commissioner,44 and related subsequent cases. The parties
in Collins were married in 1942. The wife brought property not
exceeding a value of $10,000 to the marriage while the husband
brought shares of a family-owned company. During the marriage,
the husband acquired additional stock. In accordance with the
property settlement agreement between the parties, the husband
transferred stock to the wife, the fair market value of which at the
date of transfer was greatly in excess of the husband's basis. The
husband contended that the transfer was not a taxable event
because his wife had acquired a vested right in the stock by virtue of
the marriage. Thus, the court had only to determine the extent of her
interest. The Commissioner took the opposite view, contending that
the transfer was a taxable event because Oklahoma law did not vest
any property rights in the wife, and that therefore her rights did not
resemble co-ownership. The Commissioner buttressed his position by
contending that the wife's rights were not descendible, that she
could not have prevented disposition of the property, and that she
had no right to a fixed percentage of the property. The Commis-
sioner also argued that the court's determination was based upon
factors other than her efforts to increase the value of the property,
such as her needs, her station in life, and her costs in educating the
children of the parties.45 In holding that the transfer of property
constituted a taxable event, the Tax Court based its decision upon
the determination that the wife had no vested interest in her
husband's property until the filing of the divorce and that the
division of the jointly acquired property was subject to vast judicial
discretion.46
In affirming the Tax Court ruling, the Collins court based its
decision on the fact that the wife did not have the traditional
elements of co-ownership such as a descendible interest, right of
control in and disposition of the property, and a vested interest in
44. 46 T.C. 461 (1966), aff'd, 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1968), vacated and remanded, 393
U.S. 215 (1968), for decision consistent with, Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n,
446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968), rev'd, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
45. 388 F.2d at 354.
46. 46 T.C. at 474.
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the property. 47 The division of the property between the parties need
not be equal. In fact, all of the property could be awarded to one
spouse upon the payment to the other spouse for his or her share of
the property. Although the court found that in many instances the
wife has the right to share in the property, this right does not obtain
the dignity of co-ownership. This finding was consistent with the
rule in Davis. 48
In a one sentence opinion, the United States Supreme Court
vacated and remanded the Tenth Circuit's decision in Collins49 for
reconsideration in light of an Oklahoma Supreme Court tax case
involving the same petitioner. In Collins v. Oklahoma Tax
Commission5 0 (hereinafter referred to as Collins-Oklahoma), the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the transfer of appreciated stock
was a division between co-owners, because an Oklahoma statute5'
.required the division of jointly acquired property between the
spouses upon demand. The wife therefore had a vested interest in the
property acquired by joint efforts which could not be defeated even if
she were the party principally at fault in the dissolution of the
marriage, the property were titled in the husband's name alone, or
the husband had brought separate property to the marriage and
through joint efforts, skills, or funds it had increased in value.52 It is
not surprising that on remand the Tenth Circuit reversed its former
position and found that the transaction was a non-taxable division
of property.53 The court, however, continued to stress the underlying
requirement for an examination of state law in order to determine
whether the transfer is a non-taxable division of property between
co-owners or a taxable sale of the property. The court held that the
Davis practice of looking beyond the labels to the actual rights of the
parties must be continued.54 Because the highest court of Oklahoma
concluded the division to be a non-taxable division, the Tenth Circuit
was bound by this determination and could only conclude that the
transfer was a non-taxable division between co-owners.
The Collins cases offer useful insights for analysis of the
federal income tax consequences of the Marital Property Act. In
Collins-Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that the
statutory division of property was mandatory and not permissive. In
Maryland, the monetary award permitted under the Marital
Property Act can only be interpreted as permissive because it is
discretionary with the court.55 In Oklahoma, a wife has a vested
47. 388 F.2d at 358.
48. Id.
49. 393 U.S. 215 (1968).
50. 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968).
51. Id. at 295. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (West Supp. 1961).
52. 446 P.2d at 294-95.
53. 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
54. Id. at 212.
55. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §3-6A-06(b) (Supp. 1979).
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interest in jointly acquired property even though she may be the
party at fault. In Maryland, however, the Marital Property Act
permits the court to consider fault in granting a monetary award.5 6
In Oklahoma, record title in the husband does not destroy the status
of the property as jointly acquired property subject to division. In
Maryland, the Act expressly prohibits the court from transferring
property owned by the husband to the wife.5 7 In Oklahoma, any
property brought separately by the husband into the marriage that
increases in value by his and his spouse's joint efforts, skills, or
funds becomes jointly acquired property subject to division by a
court upon divorce. In Maryland, this same property would remain
separate and not subject to division.5 8 In Oklahoma, the statutory
division may be decreed even if the court does not dissolve the
marriage. In Maryland, the court may make a monetary award only
upon granting either a divorce a vinculo matrimonii or an
annulment.59 In Oklahoma, the wife has an absolute right to the
division of the property and has absolute rights in the res itself. In
Maryland, on the other hand, the wife has no right to the res itself
but merely to a discretionary monetary award.
If Collins-Oklahoma (mandatory division rights) is accepted as
the definition of ownership, then the Maryland rule appears to place
a burden on the husband's property because the wife has only a
discretionary right to share in his property, and the court cannot
change ownership of the property. The wife's potential rights in
Maryland are limited to a discretionary monetary award that may
be reduced to a judgment, which represents a classic burden on his
property. Thus, it appears that transfers under the Maryland rule
fall within the category of a taxable transfer of property between
husband and wife similar to that in Davis. A further analysis of
other cases will provide additional support for this conclusion.
In Wiles v. Commissioner,60 the appellant's wife filed for a
divorce in Kansas. The husband and wife reached a settlement in
which neither would claim alimony, and all property, whether held
jointly or separately, would be equally divided. In order to carry out
this agreement, the husband transferred stock which had a fair
market value in excess of $500,000 and which had a basis in his
hands of about $80,000. Again, the tax issue was whether the
transfer constituted a division of property between co-owners and
was therefore not taxable. The Wiles court held that, in Kansas, the
wife had only inchoate rights to marital property. Her rights during
the marriage were limited to the provisions for intestate succession
56. Id. §3-6A-06(b)(4).
57. Id. §§ 3-6A-03(a), 3-6A-04(a).
58. Id.
59. Id. §3-6A-05(a).
60. 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974).
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which also included an interest in one-half of all of her husband's
realty which he conveyed during the marriage without obtaining her
consent. Upon the filing of the divorce in Kansas, the wife gained
additional rights. The Kansas statute provided for the court to divide
all of the couple's property in a just and reasonable manner. 61 The
division of property was solely within the trial court's discretion and
was dependent on such factors as the source of the property, the
contributions of the husband and wife, the earning capacity, fault,
needs, ages, and the length of the marriage.62 The court held that
these factors were inconsistent with co-ownership and, therefore,
failed the Davis test.63
According to Wiles, rights of actual co-ownership should be
based on more than a tenuous equitable share. Until determined, if
at all, such a share could have no real value. Despite the fact that
the Oklahoma mandatory division statute was based upon the
Kansas statute under review in Wiles, 6 4 the court also distinguished
its Collins decision and Collins-Oklahoma. The Wiles court held that
it must find a non-taxable division of ownership (even though they
apparently logically believed it was unfounded) because of the
United States Supreme Court's remand in Collins and the Court's
directive to follow the reasoning in Collins-Oklahoma that the wife
had acquired a "species of common ownership by statute."65 The
Wiles court found this interpretation troublesome, 66 however, in light
of Sanditen v. Sanditen,67 another Oklahoma decision decided after
the Collins cases. The Wiles court believed that Sanditen stood for
the proposition "that a wife has no vested rights in the property
subject to division. Vesting occurs by virtue of the divorce action and
not the marriage relationship."66 If that were true, then Sanditen
appeared to limit if not overrule Collins-Oklahoma. In attempting to
bolster its decision in Wiles by questioning the decision it was
compelled to make in Collins, however, the Tenth Circuit misinter-
preted Sanditen, which actually held that a husband could not give
away jointly acquired property with the purpose of defeating a wife's
marital rights at death.69 The Sanditen court cited a line of cases
61. KAN. STAT. ANN. §60-1610(c) (Supp. 1978).
62. 499 F.2d at 257-58. All of these factors are to be considered in the monetary
award under the Marital Property Act.
63. Id. at 258.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. "In any event, the Oklahoma position is still troublesome."
67. 496 P.2d 365 (Okla. 1972). See text accompanying note 49 supra.
68. 499 F.2d at 258.
69. 496 P.2d at 367-68 (emphasis added).
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which held that the wife's rights are protected to the extent that a
husband cannot (1) make an incomplete gift so as to defeat a wife's
intestate rights at his death, (2) give away jointly acquired property
in contemplation of divorce to limit property available for settle-
ment, (3) give away property so as to lessen his ability to support his
wife during or after a marriage, and (4) dispose of the homestead. 70
When interpreted in this light, Sanditen is consistent with those
cases holding that the wife's rights are merely protected without
stating that the rights are vested. To that extent, the Wiles court was
incorrect in holding that the rights are vested.
Wiles represents an interesting attempt by the Tenth Circuit to
steer its way past its decision in Collins and back to its safe harbor
of taxing property transfers when the wife's rights .vest only upon
the filing of a divorce. Wiles fails in this attempt, however, because
of its erroneous interpretation of Sanditen as an equivocation of the
rights clarified in Collins-Oklahoma. Far from retreating from the
proposition that the wife's rights in the husband's property vest
upon the filing of a divorce, Sanditen reiterates that position 71 and
adds that the husband may not defraud a wife of her marital rights
by giving away jointly acquired property. The Tenth Circuit seems
to hold that vesting of the rights of co-ownership can only mean a
vesting at the time the marriage began. The more appropriate and
realistic conclusion is that vesting occurs upon filing for a divorce.
This vesting recognizes the inchoate rights which the wife acquired
at the commencement of the marriage but had no need to assert so
long as the marital relationship was a strong and stable one. 72
70. Id. at 367.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Putnam v. Putnam, 104 Kan. 47, 177 P. 838, 840-41 (1919). In Putnam
the court stated:
But a wife has certain rights and interests in property acquired by
the husband during the existence of the marriage relation which, with
the aid of the statute, the courts upon proper occasion will recognize and
protect. Without such statute these rights of the wife would be imperfect
and unenforceable, but they would morally exist nevertheless, and they
only need such statute to give them legal vitality....
n . . In pioneer times the family usually commenced life with little or
no property. Land was cheap and easily acquired. The combined efforts
and economies of the husband and wife for a long stretch of years
usually resulted in prosperity, in the accumulation of the familiar forms
of Kansas property. During the years of mutual industry, self-denial, and
domestic harmony of the married couple, it would not ordinarily be
important whether each succeeding tract of land or other \property
acquired by their joint efforts was taken in the name of the husband or
wife. If they lived together happily both would enjoy the property, and
upon the death of one of them, the other's half interest would completely
mature, and the statute of wills and of descents and distributions would
protect it. If their marital partnership - for the joint accumulations of
property by a husband and wife are slightly analogous to that of a
partnership - is wrecked by marital discord and their troubles become
the concern of a divorce court, the court may equitably divide the
property accumulated during the marriage relation.
1979]
Baltimore Law Review
The vesting of rights of which the Supreme Court spoke in Davis
is not the automatic vesting of property rights at marriage as found
in community property states, 73 but rather when the inchoate rights
of the wife become absolute at any stage of the marital relationship.
It should make no difference whether the wife's rights vest
absolutely at the marriage ceremony, as in community property
states, or upon the filing of a petition for divorce, as in Collins-
Oklahoma, because both recognize the wife's contribution to the
accumulation of property by the marital unit. The important issue
for tax purposes is whether these rights vest absolutely or depend on
the discretion of any court for creation. It is equally important to
determine whether the wife has a right to the res itself. The
Maryland Marital Property Act gives neither of these rights to the
wife.
The final series of cases that may be profitably analyzed arises
from Colorado law. In Pulliam v. Commissioner,74 the appellant's
wife filed for a divorce and requested a division of property to which
the husband agreed. The trial court granted the divorce and
transferred property to the wife. The Tenth Circuit reviewed
Colorado law in attempting to ascertain the extent of the wife's
rights, and held that her rights did not vest during the marriage and
that the nature of the husband's obligation to her was personal. 75
The wife had no right of dower and only a right to one-half of the
husband's estate in intestacy. The Colorado divorce statutes
permitted the courts to grant alimony and to divide the property
using its discretion.76 Hence, the court awarded each party his own
separate property and ordered the husband to transfer one
additional parcel of property to the wife.
The husband contended in Pulliam that because the property
transfer resulted from a court decree, it was not a voluntary property
settlement agreement. Therefore, he argued that the property
transferred could not be valued at its fair market value as in an
arm's length transaction, and that he could not be held responsible
for the gain recognized. The court rejected this argument by
applying the Davis holding that "where property without ascertaina-
ble value is exchanged for other property in an arm's length
transaction, . . . the values of the property on each side of the
73. Harrah v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 735 (1978). For a more detailed explanation of
community property law, see PEPPY & DEFUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES (1975); Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-
Spousal Transactions, 19 BAYLOR L. REV. 20 (1967).
74. 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1964).
75. Id. at 97-98.
76. Id. at 98.
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exchange are equal,' 77 even though it was not a true voluntary
transaction. The court also rejected the argument that emotional
factors prevented this from being an arm's length transaction. The
court concluded that because both parties requested the division of
property, the best solution would be to treat the transfer for tax
purposes as though it were voluntary.78 In a final attempt to
distinguish Davis, the husband argued that there was no release of
marital rights in exchange for the property transferred. The court
concluded, however, that the decree ended any marital rights to
which the wife may have been entitled and thereby acted in a
manner similar to a voluntary property settlement agreement
including a release of marital rights.
Pulliam is important in applying Maryland law because of the
court's careful analysis of state law to determine the nature of the
wife's rights. The court's determination that the rights of the wife do
not attain the dignity of co-ownership is based upon the conditional
nature of those rights as evidenced by the discretionary power in the
court to divide the property. The Tenth Circuit's analysis that the
decree operates in the same manner as a release of marital rights
found in a voluntary separation agreement is likewise well reasoned.
Although the finding in Pulliam was eventually overturned by Imel
v. United States,79 dictating that in Colorado the wife's rights are
now found to attain the dignity of co-ownership, 0 Pulliam's studied
approach to a difficult problem is welcome.
A subsequent Tenth Circuit case, Hayutin v. Commissioner,81
however, is consistent with Pulliam, notwithstanding that court's
later decision in Imel. The parties were married in 1945 and divorced
seventeen years later. In a property settlement agreement, the wife
was to receive $198,000 which consisted of the husband's interest in
the house, a $5,000 note, the household goods, and a cash settlement
of $163,000 to be paid over the course of eighteen years. Due to the
inconsistent treatment of this payment by the husband and wife on
their respective tax returns,8 2 the Commissioner assessed deficien-
cies against both parties. The wife's claim that these payments were
not alimony but were in recognition of a non-taxable division of
property by co-owners was rejected.8 3
In Imel, decided in the same term as Hayutin, the wife had
obtained her divorce in Colorado in 1964 with the court retaining
77. Id. at 99.
78. Id.
79. 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975).
80. Id. at 856-57.
81. 508 F.2d 462 (1'0th Cir. 1974).
82. I.R.C. §§ 71(a), 71(c), 215. The husband reported a larger alimony deduction than
the wife reported income.
83. 508 F.2d at 469.
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jurisdiction over alimony and a future division of property. In 1965,
the court approved a property settlement agreement entered into by
the parties, finding that the wife was an active participant in the
accumulation of the family wealth, that the agreement fairly
recognized this participation, and that it was a fair division of the
property. In accordance with the agreement, the husband trans-
ferred corporate stock which had a fair market value in excess of
$1,100,000 and a basis in his hands of $400,000. The Commissioner
assessed a deficiency against the husband, who paid it under protest
and filed a timely petition for refund with the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado. The issue before the district court
was whether the transfer was a non-taxable division of property
between co-owners. The district court entered judgment in favor of
the taxpayer. 3a
On appeal, the primary argument offered by the Commissioner
was that "state law cannot determine what is a taxable event under
the federal income tax laws. ' ' 84 The Imel court disagreed by noting
that while it is state law which defines one's interests and rights in
domestic relations, it is federal law which determines how the
transfer of those interests and rights are taxed.
The Commissioner also argued that the decision of the Colorado
Supreme Court was contrary to Davis. The Tenth Circuit noted in
Imel that the Colorado Supreme Court found that the wife had a
species of common ownership similar to that which the Oklahoma
court had found in Collins-Oklahoma. The court also noted that it
was persuaded by Collins-Oklahoma to find a non-taxable division
of property between co-owners. Imel was the first post-Collins case to
reach the Tenth Circuit, and that court held the transfer to be
taxable after it considered the Pulliam decision and the similarity
between Oklahoma and Colorado law. The court realized it was
facing a dilemma when it said: "We have now gone full circle. Just
as Oklahoma held that we were wrong in Collins # 1 so has Colorado
ruled that Pulliam does not state Colorado law. We followed the
Oklahoma decision and the question is whether we should follow the
Colorado decision. '18 8 The court solved its dilemma by holding that
Davis "did not establish a federal standard as to the nature of the
pre-transfer right in the transferred property, '86 nor did it "define
the time when the interest of the wife had to vest."8 The court noted
that in Oklahoma and Colorado, the wife's rights become vested
with the filing of the divorce. The court held that there was "nothing
83a. 523 F.2d at 853-54.
84. Id. at 855.
85. Id. at 856.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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in Davis which requires that the wife's interest vest before the
bringing of the divorce action. '88
In affirming the decision of the district court that there was a
non-taxable division of property between co-owners, the Tenth
Circuit reviewed most of the cases which have been previously
discussed in this article. Davis was noted because of its recognition
that it would permit different tax treatment of property settlement in
different states.8 9 Pulliam was discussed to show that the court had
previously ruled that in Colorado, the wife's rights did not vest so as
to attain the dignity of co-ownership. 90 The Collins cases were
reviewed to show that the United States Supreme Court required the
Tenth Circuit to review its decision in light of Collins-Oklahoma
which held that the wife acquired a species of common ownership. 91
Finally, the court analyzed both its certification to the Colorado
Supreme Court for the determination of the nature and extent of the
wife's rights92 and the district court's analysis of the tax consequen-
ces thereon. The court added credence to its position by noting that
the Colorado Supreme Court decision was a true adversarial
proceeding in which both Colorado and federal law were reviewed.9 :
The Tenth Circuit's attempt to distinguish both Wiles and
Hayutin is interesting. It reasoned that Wiles was decided in
accordance with Davis and that the wife's rights do not vest under
Kansas law. According to the court, Hayutin was distinguishable on
both the law and the facts. This conclusion is questionable when the
reader considers the careful review of authorities and the outright
dismissal of the Imel certification question by the court in
Hayutin.94 This pitiful attempt to distinguish Hayutin serves no
purpose because the exact question answered in Hayutin is later
overruled in Imel.
Finally, it is interesting to note the emphasis which the court
placed on certification in reaching its decision.' 5 It must be
remembered that the Colorado Supreme Court decision in Imel was
available to the Tenth Circuit in Hayutin, and it chose to ignore that
Imel decision. Certification can be useful when it defines the nature
and extent of the wife's rights. The decision of whether these rights,
however, attain the dignity of co-ownership perhaps should be left to
the federal courts; otherwise, the state court has in essence
determined the federal tax consequences of a disposition of property.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 854.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. In re Questions Submitted by the United States District Court, 184 Colo. 1, 517
P.2d 1331 (1974).
93. 523 F.2d at 855.
94. 508 F.2d at 468-69.
95. 523 F.2d at 856-57.
1979]
Baltimore Law Review
Federal courts, at this point, probably believe that they must
automatically comply with a certification in this matter in light of
the remand by the Supreme Court in Collins. Certainly, the legal
community would have been better served if the Supreme Court
delineated how the wife's rights attained the dignity of co-
ownership.
V. THE EFFECT IN MARYLAND
A. The Monetary Award
A review of the important cases on the subject perhaps provides
an answer to the fundamental question of whether a wife's rights
attain the dignity of co-ownership such that a non-taxable division
of property results when a monetary award is given by a court in
accordance with Maryland's Marital Property Act. In light of the
cases, a practitioner should conclude that the wife's rights do not
attain the dignity of a co-ownership in Maryland. Davis states that
the attorney must look beyond labels to the actual rights of the wife.
In Maryland, the statute clearly delineates the wife's rights by
stating that the court cannot transfer ownership of the property
from one spouse to the other.9 6 How then can the wife's rights attain
the dignity of co-ownership if she cannot take title to the property
itself? Clearly, she cannot be a co-owner as the cases have defined
that term. Absent any rights to the res itself, it would be mere legal
sophistry to argue that a division of property occurs between co-
owners in Maryland.
This opinion is not based on this conclusion alone but on the
other factors which have been discussed by the courts. The Collins
cases are extremely important because they delineate the standards
which must be satisfied if a division of property between co-owners
is to be achieved. It should not be left to state courts arbitrarily to
determine co-ownership, because it is the absolute nature of the
wife's rights which enable her to be designated as a co-owner.
Absolute rights should be created by legislatures, not courts.
The Oklahoma statute requires a division of jointly acquired
property upon divorce.9 7 By comparison, the rights granted to the
wife under the Maryland Act pale into insignificance, because, in
Maryland, the wife has no right to any share of the property itself.
The monetary award is solely a matter of the court's discretion and
fault is used by the court as a factor to determine the amount of the
award. The husband's separate property is expressly excluded by
statute from any determination in computing the monetary award. If
96. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§3-6A-03(a), 3-6A3-04(a) (Supp. 1979).
97. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (West Supp. 1978).
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a comparison is made of the wife's rights in Oklahoma with the
wife's rights in Maryland, the Oklahoma rights are absolute and
vested rather than contingent and tentative as in Maryland. Prior to
the passage of the Marital Property Act, the wife's rights were
clearly inchoate. She had a right to a statutory share of her
husband's property at his death and the right to alimony should she
be granted a divorce, but at no time did she have a right to his
property which amounted to co-ownership. The question which now
must be asked is whether the Act grants new rights which are
indicative of co-ownership. The author thinks not, for the wife is still
not entitled to share in the property itself. Her rights remain
inchoate in nature subject to discretionary invocation by the court,
and the wife is not entitled to a mandatory division of the husband's
property.
In reflecting upon whether the wife's rights attain the dignity of
co-ownership, one must examine the concept of the wife's attaining
additional rights upon the filing of a divorce. The cases examined
reveal that Kansas, Iowa, Oklahoma, and Colorado recognize
certain rights of the wife upon the filing of a divorce. Following
enactment of the Marital Property Act, Maryland has apparently
joined this circle of states that has rejected the traditional concept
of co-ownership during marriage. These traditional elements of
ownership of property can be defined as the possession of a
descendible interest, the right to control the property, and the right
to dispose of the property. The above-mentioned states, however, do
not recognize this traditional definition and, instead, examine the
rights of the parties upon the filing of the divorce. The traditional
factors play a role in the analysis by the courts of these states
secondary to the recognition of the indirect and direct efforts by each
spouse in accumulating and enhancing the value of the marital
property. The courts and society in general have re-examined the
traditional concepts of marriage and divorce;98 perhaps a redefini-
tion of co-ownership in marriage is also appropriate. The filing of a
divorce, which was the exception not so many years ago, is now an
almost common fact of life. The law of domestic relations must
reflect these changes in society. The Marital Property Act is an
attempt to reflect such change by recognizing that during a
marriage, property contributed initially by the husband is enhanced
in value by monetary as well as non-monetary contributions of the
wife. The Act attempts to recognize that the husband and the wife
both contribute to the marriage and to the accumulation of property,
no matter how it is titled. This law recognizes that when a marriage
is dissolved, the wife should receive a share of the property that
reflects her contribution to it. The law recognizes a right which the
98. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
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wife need not assert while the marriage is sound. This change is
timely and proper. The method Maryland has chosen, however, does
not give to the wife the rights of co-ownership for federal tax
purposes. Her rights are discretionary with the court and do not
entitle her to the property itself. She is not a co-owner. The wife's
monetary award, which may be reduced to judgment, can only be
classified as a burden .on the husband's property or an obligation of
a personal nature to the husband. Consequently, it must be
concluded that, in Maryland, there is not a division of property
between co-owners, and that the wife's rights are inchoate in nature.
Inasmuch as it has been concluded that there is not a non-
taxable division of property between co-owners in Maryland, the
remaining question is the tax consequence of the wife's monetary
award. It is the author's belief that the monetary award should be
treated in the same manner as the voluntary property settlement
agreement in Davis, that is as a sale. 99 The Supreme Court, in Davis,
noted that the current administrative practice was not to consider
the surrender of the wife's rights as a taxable event.100 In order to be
a taxable event, there should be gain. Because there is no basis in
marital rights, there is no way to calculate gain. If the gain cannot
be determined, there is no practical way to assess the tax. The
Commissioner has subsequently ruled that the wife realizes no gain
or loss on the surrender of her dower rights in exchange for an
interest in real property.101 Because dower has been labelled by the
Supreme Court as an inchoate right which has not attained the
dignity of co-ownership, 102 and it appears that the wife's rights in
Maryland are still inchoate in nature, the wife will continue not to
recognize any taxable gain upon the receipt of money in satisfaction
of her monetary award. The wife, at least for tax purposes, is treated
as if she participated in a non-taxable division of property in a
community property state. In Delaware, under Davis, the wife is not
taxed on the property she receives in a voluntary settlement
agreement. Likewise, in Maryland, she should not be taxed on the
monetary award that she receives.
The Maryland husband has not made a sale in the usual sense,
but will be taxed as if he had. For the price of the award, he receives
the wife's marital rights as in Davis. In satisfying the monetary
award, the husband will create a cost basis to him in these rights, for
he will take the fair market value of the property transferred by him
as the basis in the inchoate rights of the wife which he receives. 10 3
99. Wallace v. United States, 439 F.2d 757, 760-61 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
831 (1971).
100. 370 U.S. at 730 n.7.
101. Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63.
102. 370 U.S. at 70.
103. Id. at 72-73. See also I.R.C. § 1011.
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The question, therefore, is how to allocate this basis to his marital
property. An analysis by the court of the wife's contribution to each
item of marital property would seem to satisfy the Davis presump-
tion that the sale between the husband and wife is an arm's length
transaction 104 and, in the absence of this analysis, the husband
should allocate the amount of the monetary award to his marital
property to reflect the purchase of his wife's inchoate rights in each
item of marital property.
B. The Use and Possession Order
As stated previously the wife is entitled to a use and possession
order for the family home and family use personal property.
Moreover, the husband may be ordered to pay the rent, mortgage,
insurance, taxes, and maintenance related to the property. 105 Before
examining the tax treatment of these items, it is important to
remember that, according to the statute, if the wife remarries, her
right to these payments terminates. 106 The condition against
remarriage is important inasmuch as it enables the husband to treat
these items as deductions for federal tax purposes 107 because of a
contingency imposed by local law despite failure of the payments to
extend over ten years.108 As long as the payments are periodic and
conditional in nature, they will meet the preliminary requirements of
being includible in the wife's income'0 9 and deductible by the
husband;10 however, a further analysis is necessary in order to
characterize there payments accurately.
In Marinello v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held that, when
pursuant to a divorce decree the husband is obligated to pay the
wife's rent, this rent is includible in the wife's income and deductible
by the husband."1 This case is interesting because the husband
transferred the property (in which his wife was still living) to his
wholly owned corporation and then paid rent to the corporation. The
Tax Court characterized the payment of rent by the husband to his
corporation as periodic payments which are includible in the wife's
income. Because the court also permitted the husband's payments
for heat to be included in the periodic payments in Marinello, then
arguably, payments by the husband in Maryland pursuant to a use
and possession order for rent, utilities, heat, and maintenance
104. 370 U.S. at 72.
105. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §3-6A-06(c)(2) (Supp. 1979).
106. Id. §3-6A-06(a).
107. Treas. Reg. § 1.71- 1(d)(3)(i)(a) (1963).
108. Rev. Rul. 59-190, 1959-1 C.B. 23.
109. I.R.C. §71.
110. Id. § 215.
111. 54 T.C. 577 (1970).
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should be includible in the wife's income and deductible by the
husband.
A contrary decision was reached in Pappenheimer v. Allen. 112 In
Pappenheimer the husband owned an unencumbered home. Pursu-
ant to a consent decree, the wife was to occupy the home until her
death, her remarriage, the marriage of all of the children, or their
youngest child attained age twenty-three, whichever occurred first.
The husband attempted to deduct the fair rental value of the home
as a periodic payment to the wife pursuant to a decree of divorce.
The Fifth Circuit disallowed this deduction because the judgment
specified that the wife had a unified or single right to occupy the
home; because occupancy was continuing, there were no periodic
payments by the husband. A use and possession order which permits
the wife to occupy the husband's home free of rent would neither
give the husband a right to deduct the value of the rental nor
impose an obligation on the wife to take into income the value of the
rental.
Under certain conditions following a use and possession order,
the husband will be permitted a partial deduction of his mortgage
payment for a property held by tenancy in common. The Commis-
sioner has ruled that one-half of the interest, principal, insurance,
and taxes is deductible by the husband and includible by the wife
provided the payments cover a period of more than ten years or are
otherwise periodic.1 3 As discussed previously, the statutory condi-
tion of termination because of remarriage makes these items periodic
both under the regulations and revenue rulings.114 The same ruling
also held that one-half of the interest and property taxes are
allocable to the husband and deductible by him and that one-half of
the interest and property taxes are deductible by the wife under
sections 163 and 164 of the Internal Revenue Code. The Commis-
sioner also has noted that the one-half payment attributable to the
husband's ownership interest is clearly not deductible to him. 1 5
The Commissioner has also determined that where mortgage
payments are made by the husband on property owned in tenancy
by the entireties or in joint tenancy with right of survivorship with
his wife, one-half of the mortgage payment and interest is includible
in the wife's income and deductible by the husband, provided the
payments otherwise qualify as alimony. 16 It should be noted that
under a use and possession order in Maryland, the above determina-
tion is applicable even if a divorce a mensa et thoro is granted; such
112. 164 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1947).
113. Rev. Rul. 62-39, 1962-1 C.B. 17.
114. See notes 106-110 and accompanying text supra.
115. Rev. Rul. 59-190, 1959-1 C.B. 23.
116. Rev. Rul. 67-420, 1967-2 C.B. 63.
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a divorce does not terminate a tenancy by the entireties. 117 When a
divorce a vinculo matrimonii is granted, however, the tenancy by
entireties is terminated and becomes a tenancy in common; 1 8 the
rules applicable to a tenancy in common would then apply.
Insurance and real estate taxes paid by the husband are not
includible in the wife's income when the property is owned in
tenancy by the entireties.1 9 Real estate taxes, on the other hand, are
deductible by the husband if he itemizes them. No matter how the
home is owned by the parties, utilities are deductible as alimony
when paid by the husband for the wife under a use and possession
order because they are considered current expenses for the enjoy-
ment of the property. 20
VI. FOOD FOR THOUGHT FOR MARYLAND
TAX ADVISORS
The parties to a divorce need not wait to have their marital
property rights determined by the court. They may still enter into a
valid agreement that determines the nature and value of these
rights.12' Having shown that in Maryland the wife's rights are
inchoate in nature, a transfer of property by the husband in
satisfaction of these rights would appear to be a mirror image of the
tax consequences of Davis. Specifically, the husband would realize
gain to the extent that the fair market value of the property
transferred to the wife exceeds his basis in it, and the wife would not
realize gain upon the surrender of her marital rights. Her basis in
the property which she receives would be its fair market value. 22 To
that extent, Maryland taxpayers can anticipate a result consistent
with Davis.
With these conclusions in mind, the husband can follow several
different routes to minimize his tax consequences. Clearly the first
alternative is to transfer property with a high basis in reference to
its fair market value so as to minimize gain. The second alternative
is for the property settlement agreement to allocate the wife's
marital property rights to specific marital property and to provide
for the husband to give the wife a lump sum cash settlement. The
husband can then sell the designated property to provide for the
cash necessary in the settlement and also realize less gain due to his
purchase of the wife's inchoate rights and the accompanying
increase in basis to the property to which the cost of the rights was
117. Roberts v. Roberts, 160 Md. 513, 154 A. 95 (1931).
118. Keen v. Keen, 191 Md. 31, 60 A.2d 206 (1948).
119. Rev. Rul. 62-38, 1962-1 C.B. 15.
120. Rev. Rul. 62-39, 1962-1 C.B. 17.
121. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §3A-6A-01(e) (Supp. 1979).
122. 370 U.S. at 72-73.
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allocated. The nature of his gain will depend upon the property
transferred by the husband to the wife.
A word of caution is in order, however. First, in assigning values
of the wife's inchoate rights, the husband should assign those rights
to marital property and not to his separate property. In Jean
C. Carrieres,1 23 the Tax Court held that the wife in a community
property state realized gain when she received a portion of her
husband's separate property instead of receiving a portion of the
marital property. The gain was realized because the wife exchanged
community property with a cost basis for separate property (cash).
The court treated this exchange as a sale. By analogy, it appears
doubtful that the Commissioner would permit the use of separate
property in Maryland to satisfy a marital property rights obligation
without the wife's full realization of th. gain attributable to the
separate property. The increase in basis due to the purchase of the
inchoate marital rights cannot be transferred to the husband's
separate property, only to marital property. Second, the parties
should attempt a fair allocation as to what the husband is paying for
alimony and what he is paying or transferring in exchange for the
wife's marital rights. In Grant R. Bishop,124 the Commissioner
successfully recharacterized what the parties had labelled solely
alimony as both a non-deductible division of community property
and alimony. It is suggested that a reasonable allocation must
therefore be attempted to avoid the attention that an unreasonable
allocation would certainly draw, as happened in Bishop.
VII. CONCLUSION
In summary, the Marital Property Act does not elevate the wife's
rights in Maryland to the level of co-ownership. It does provide,
however, for tax planning opportunities which should be utilized. An
award by a court pursuant to the new statute is not classified as
income for the wife. This result is curious because the wife's rights
do not attain the dignity of co-ownership. It is the unique
construction of the Marital Property Act that permits this result. In
addition, a property settlement agreement under the act is a classic
Davis transfer with its accompanying tax problems for the husband.
123. 64 T.C. 959 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977).
124. 55 T.C. 720, 725 (1971).
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